. Introduction
Default reasoning is the process of drawing conclusions from i) a set of general rules which may have exceptions, and ii) a set of facts representing the available information (which is often incomplete). The conclusions so drawn are only plausi ble and can be revised in the light of the new information.
The desirable properties for a consequence relation that capture default reasoning have been discussed at length in the AI liter ature. They can be summarized as follows.
Rationality: the consequence operator used to generate plausible conclusions from a knowledge base should sat isfy the rationality postulates proposed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990) .
Specificity: results obtained from sub-classes should over ride those obtained from super-classes (Touretzky, 1984) .
For example, from the knowledge base 6. = {"Birds fly", "Penguins do not fly", "Penguins are birds"}, one should deduce that birds which are penguins do not fly, since penguins are a subclass of birds.
Property inheritance: objects should inherit properties from super-classes unless there is contradiction on that property. For example, from the previous 6., one should deduce that birds that are red fly, since being red is irrele vant to flying. Also, if we add the rule "Birds have legs", then one should deduce that penguins have legs too, since having legs is not a conflicting property. Failure to per form these deductions is referred to as the problem of "irrelevance" and of "inheritance blocking", respectively.
Ambiguity preservation: in a situation where we have an argument in favor of a proposition, and an independent argument in favor of its negation, we should not conclude anything about that proposition. The most popular ex ample is the so-called Nixon-diamond: knowing that B-1 050 Bruxelles, Belgium "Quakers are pacifists", "Republicans are not pacifists", and Nixon is both a Quaker and a republican, one should not deduce that Nixon is a pacifist, nor that he is not. l Syntax independence: the consequences of a knowledge base should not depend on the syntactical form used. In particular, they should not be sensitive to duplications of rules in the knowledge base ("redundancy").
In the last decade there have been several proposals for reason ing with default information. Some of them are based on the use of uncertainty models such as probability theory (Adams, 1975; Pearl, 1988) , or possibility theory (Dubois and Prade, 1988; Benferhat et al., 1992) . Up to now, however, no single system has been reported that correctly addresses all of the desiderata above. In this paper, we show how we can use be lief functions, originally developed for modeling uncertainty (Shafer, 1976; Smets, 1988) , to build a non-monotonic sys tem that gives a satisfactory answer to all of the above issues.
There have already been a few works on representing default information with belief functions (e.g., Hsia, 1991; Smets and Hsia, 1991 ) . These works require the assessment of nu meric values, whose origin is often an open question. Finding a solution free from such assessments would some how avoid the problem of the origin of the numbers. In this paper, we give another interpretation of default information by using a class of "extreme" belief functions, called epsilon-be lief functions, whose non-null masses are either close to 0 or close to 1. The idea of using extreme values is not new to plausible reasoning: for instance, Adams (1975) and Pearl (1990) use extreme probabilities to encode default informa tion; and De Kleer (1990) and Poole ( 1993) use extreme probabilities for diagnosis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next sec tion, we give a short reminder on Adams' e-semantics and Pearl' System Z, and recall a few notions of the theory of be lief functions (see (Shafer, 1976; Smets, 1988) for a complete exposition). In section 3, we introduce e-belief functions, and show how to use them to defme a non-monotonic consequence relation. This relation turns out to be too cautious, and we define two more relations in sections 4 and 5. The first one is based on the least-commitment principle, and is equivalent to system Z. The second one uses Dempster's rule of combina tion, and is incomparable with the current systems. In section 6, we study this relation in more detail and show that it cor rectly addresses all of the issues above.
1 Note that this is different from the situation of inconsistency, where we have an argument which supports both a conclusion and its contrary, as in "a.�P" and "a.�-.p".
. Background
We are interested in default rules of the form "generally, if we have a then we have w·. where a and � are formulae of some underlying language ;£, . For the goals of this paper, we as sume that;£, is a classical propositional language. An inter pretation for;£, is an assignment of a truth value in {T, F} to each formula of ;£, in accordance with the classical rules of propositional calculus; we denote by n the set of all such in terpretations (also called worlds). We say that an interpreta tion ro is a model of a formula a, and write 0> F a iff ro(a) = T, and denote by [a] the set of all the models of a. We write a default rule "generally, if a then �" as a-+�.
where a and � are formulae of;£,. Note that "-+" is a non classical arrow, and it should not be confused with material implication. Given a default rule d = a-+�. we denote by 4> d the formula of ;£, obtained by replacing -+ by material impli cation, namely, 4> d = ..., av�. A default base is a multiset 6 = { a i -+� i · i=l, ... ,n} of default rules. We emphasize that a base is a multiset rather than a set, i.e., 6 = {a-+�} is different from6' ={a-+�, a-+�}.
We use default bases to represent background knowledge about what normally is the case. Given a base 6, we are interested in defining a consequence relation t-v between formulae of ;£, that tells us which consequences we can reasonably drawn from the known facts. We would like 1-v to fulfill the desiderata listed above. For example, given the base 6 = {b-+f, p-+b, p-+..., f} (where "b" stands for "bird", "f' for "flies", and "p" for "penguin"), we would like to have b 1-v f and bAp t-v ..., f, but not bAp t-v f. (1975) , and later Pearl (1988) , have suggested a proba bilistic interpretation where a default rule a-+� is read as a constraint P(�la) > 1-£, with P a probability distribution and £ an infinitesimal positive number. Given a set of defaults 6, they construct a class of probability distributions Ae such that, for each distribution P in Ae and each default a-+� in 6, P(�la) > 1-£. A formula � is said to be an e-consequence of a with respect to 6, denoted by at--£ �• if for each Pe Ae there exists a real function 0 such that lime-+ 0 0(£) = 0 and P(�la) > 1-0(£). Said differently, � is a consequence of a with respect to 6 if the conditional probability P(�la) is very high provided that the conditional probability of each default in 6 is very high. Lehmann and Magidor ( 1992) have shown that £-consequence is equivalent to the system P of Kraus et al (1990) , which is commonly regarded as the minimal core of any "reasonable" non-monotonic system. Adams' £-consequence is not entirely satisfactory. For exam ple, it suffers from the problem of irrelevance mentioned above: from the default "Generally, birds fly", £-consequence does not deduce that red birds fly also. To overcome this limi tation, Pearl (1990) has proposed a default reasoning system, called Z, based on a ranking of default rules that respects the notion of specificity. Given a default base 6 = { a i -+ � i I i = 1, ... ,m}, Pearl gives a method to rank-order the rules in 6 such that the least specific rules (i.e. with most general an tecedents) get the least priority. To do this, he defines the no tion of tolerance: a rule a-+ � is said to be tolerated by a base {a i -+�i· i = 1, ... ,m} iff {aA�, -.a 1 v� 1 • ... , ..., a m v� m } is consistent. Then, he partitions 6 into an ordered set { 6 1 , 6 2 , ... , 6 k } such that rules in 6 i are tolerated by all rules in 6 i u ... u 6 k . From this partition, Pearl induces a ranking 1C on worlds and, from this, a ranking z on formulae.
Probabilistic semantics for default rules

Adams
Roughly speaking, 1C(O>) corresponds to the index of the low est sub-base that contains a rule violated by ro; and z(a) is the minimum rank of a model of a -so, z(a) can be read as a degree of "abnormality" of a with respect to the rules in 6. Finally, Pearl defines a non-monotonic inference relation, de noted here by 1-v Z• as follows
An equivalent treatment of default information has been done in the framework of possibility theory (B enferhat et al., 1992) .
A reminder on belief functions
Let n be a finite set of worlds, one of them being the actual world. A basic belief assignment on n is a function m: The term pl(A) quantifies the degree of plausibility, of poten tial support, that the agent could give to the fact that the ac tual world belongs to A. When the focal elements of a basic belief assignment are singletons, then bel = pl is a probabil ity measure. When the focal elements A}. ...• A n are nested (that is, A 1 s; ... �A n ). bel is called a consonant belief func tion, and bel is a necessity measure and pl is a possibility measure (Zadeh, 1978; Dubois and Prade, 1988) . When m has at most one focal element A ;e n, it is called a simple sup port function.
When a new piece of evidence telling that the actual world be longs to A becomes available to the agent, his/her belief is revised by the application of the so-called Dempster's rule of conditioning. The basic belief mass m(X) that was supporting the subset X of n, now supports XnA. This transfer of be lief masses is described by the following relation, where bel( .lA) denotes the conditional belief function.
2 In the transferable belief model (Smets and Kennes, 199 4 ) , belief functions are not necessarily normalized. i.e., we can have m(0) > 0. Normalization is assumed here as we only study ratios between bel(BIA) and bel(QIA), which corresponds to studying the normalized belief functions.
The impact of a piece of evidence E that bears on n is repre sented by a belief function bel that describes the agent's be liefs on n given E (and nothing else). Suppose the agent re ceives two distinct pieces of evidence E 1 and E2, and let bell and bel2 be the belief functions induced by each evidence indi vidually. The combined effect of E 1 and E2 is represented by the belief function bell E9bel2 obtained by Dempster's rule of combination. The corresponding basic belief assignment, de noted by m 1 EBm2. is given by
In this section, we extend the definition of E-semantics in a belief function framework. First, we introduce the notion of epsilon-belief functions, whose values are either close to 0 or close to 1. Next, we interpret a default rule a-+� as meaning that the conditional belief bel([�]l[a]) is close to 1. Finally, we define a consequence relation in a natural way: a-+� fol lows from a base of defaults 6. if, for each epsilon-belief func tion which satisfies all the default rules in 6. (i.e., the condi tional belief of each rule is close to 1), we have bel([�]l[a]) close to 1. It turns out that this definition gives us the same results as Adams' E-consequence relation. Throughout this paper, we denote by bele and pi E the belief and plausibility functions corresponding to a given epsilon mass assignment me· Definition 2. Let bele be an E-bf with parameter E. We say that bele is an ebf-model of a default rule <X-+�. and write bele I= a-+�, iff lime -+0 bele([�]l[a]) = I, where the limit is taken with respect to all the elements in E going to 0.
When working with values that depend on E, we will often use the notion of one value being infinitely larger than an other, written a >oo b. We say that a >oo b if lime -+0 b/a = 0. We also say that a and b are of the same order, written a = b, if lime -+0 b/a = c, with c *-0 and finite. The follow ing properties will be useful for working with E-bfs.3 It is interesting to note that the satisfaction relation I= for E bf can also be defined in terms of preferential semantics (Shoham, 1988; Kraus et a!., 1990 ). This will tum out to be useful to relate our systems to other existing ones through well-known results. To create the link, we associate each E-bf bele with a preferential order among worlds in n as follows.
Definition 3. Let bele be an E-bf on n, and a a formula of £. . The bel-preference induced by bele is the partial order <e given by: ro <e ro' iff ple({ro'}) >oo ple({ro}). A model roof a is called a bel-preferred model of a if there is no other world ro' that satisfies a such that ro' <e ro.
Lemma 2. Let bele be an E-bf on n. For any a, � formu lae of £. , bele I= a-+� if, and only if, each bel-preferred model of a satisfies �-Our next step is to use E-bf models to define the notion of entailment for default bases, i.e., to define which conditional assertions a-+� are entailed by a default base 6.. Our first solution is a direct adaptation of the usual definition of logical entailment. We say that an E-bf bele is an Ebf-model of 6., written bele I= 6., iff bele is an ebf-model of all the rules in 6.. We denote by Bele(6.) the set of all the Ebf-models of A. Then, a formula � is said to be a bf-consequence of a (w.r.t.. to 6.), denoted by a tv bf �. if and only if each E-bf bele of Bele(6.) is an ebf-model of a-+�. i.e.
(BF) a tv bf � iff for any bele in Bele(6.), belel= a-+�.
Bf-consequence turns out to be equivalent to the system P of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990) , which in tum is equiva lent to Adams' E-system. Theorem 1. For a given 6., a tv bf � iff a tv p �-The proof, given in (Benferhat et a!., 1995) , proceeds as fol lows. Left to right, note that Adams' infinitesimal probability distributions are a special case of our E-bf, and then a tv bf � only if a tv E �. only if a tv p �-Right to left, use lemma 2 to see that each inference relation induced by any bele in Bele(6.) is preferential. So, f-.-bf satisfies the rules of P, and then it contains all preferential consequences of 6.. This result shows that we can use (infinitesimal) belief func tions to give an alternative formalization of the systems E and P. It also shows that tv bf suffers from the same limitations of these systems; in particular, it does not solve the problems of irrelevance and blocking of inheritance. In the next two sections, we propose two ways to define a more bold conse quence relation by restricting our attention in (BF) to just some of the models in Bele(6.).
. Entailment based on least-commitment
One way to select some of the Ebf-models of 6. is by using the notion of being minimally informative: intuitively, we want to look at the consequences of "only knowing" 6. (and nothing more). A similar approach has been taken, for the case of possibility measures, by Benferhat et a! (199 2 ) . We recall the following Definition 4. Let bel 1 and bel2 two (epsilon-) belief func tions over n. Then, bell is less committed that bel2 iff, for any A � 0, pl 1 (A) � pl2(A).
The least-commitment principle (Smets, 1988) states that, in order to model an item of information by a belief function, we should use the least committed belief function that is compat ible with the information. Note that the least committed be lief function representing a formula a is given by the simple support function that gives mass 1 to [a] and 0 anywhere else. We show how to build an ebf-model of A based on this principle. We start by allocating a quasi-unitary mass to the set [$ A l of the worlds where (the propositional equivalent ot) all the defaults in A are satisfied, and the remaining mass E to .0.. If there were no conflict in the defaults, this allocation would be an ebf-model of A. When there are conflicts, how ever, this E-bf will not satisfy some of the defaults in Anamely, those that inherit a conflicting property from a more general class. Then, we put aside the defaults that are already satisfied, and put almost all of the free mass E on the set [$ A • ] corresponding to the still unsatisfied defaults, leaving a small E' on .0.. This new E-bf is an Ebf-model of A' (and of A) if we have no conflicts in A'. Otherwise, we iterate the procedure until the E-bf will satisfy all the defaults in A.
More precisely, let E = (Et, ... , E n ) be a vector of infinitesi mals such that E i >oo E i + 1 for any i = l, ... , n-1 .
where n is the cardinality of A. We build an E-bf in the fol lowing way.
Step 0 If satj = 0 and O i ;t0 then Fail.
Step 2. Return bel i-1 .
Note that all the focal elements are nested -the inner one be ing [$ A ]-and then the final E-bf returned by Step 2 is a con sonant belief function. The procedure fails to find an E-bf if A is inconsistent; in this case, we have satj = 0 and o i :;t 0. • We denote by BelLc(A) the family of E-bfs built by the pro-. cedure above -the elements of this family differ in the choice of E, provided that (E L c) is satisfied. This family "behaves well" for our goals: it is a subset of Bel e (A), and it induces a unique ordering < e on the worlds in .0.. The latter property means that we can decide entailment by j ust looking at one element of BelLc(A).
Lemma 3. Let A be a default base. Then: a) Any element of BelLe( A) is an Ebf-model of A . b) Let belt and belz be two elements of BelLe( A), and < 1 and <2 the corresponding orderings induced on n. Then,< 1 ::<2.
It is interesting to compare BelLc(A) with the result of the stratification proposed by Pearl ( 1 988). We can show that the focal elements of the partitions of BelLc(A) are directly related to the elements of the partition of A obtained by Z.
Lemma 4. Let A = A 1 u ... uA n be the stratification given by system Z, and let bel i the E-bf built by our algorithm at step i. Then, for any default a�J3 in A, a) a�l3 is tolerated by A iff plt ([aj]) = 1 b) a�J3eA i iff bel i I= a�l3.
So, our algorithm produf:es the same ranking over A than Z. However, our approach does not require an a priori definition of the notion of "tolerance", but relies on the notion of being "less committed". Which of these two notions provides a more natural starting point is a matter of opinion.
We now use the set BelLc(A) to give our second definition of entailment. It is similar to (BF), but we restrict the attention to the Ebf-models that are in BelLc(A).
(LC) a � lc 13 iff for any be l e e BelLe( A), bel e I= a�l3.
Example 2. We can use the E-bf belz built in Example 1 to check that we have bAp � lc -.f. In fact, we have plz((bApA-.f]) = e 1 , plz((bApAf]) = Ez, and Et>ooEz. Hence, by lemma l, lim e�O belz([-.f]l[bAp]) = l, and then bAp � lc ..,f.
• As BelLe( A) is a subset of Bel e (A}, lc-consequences include bf-consequences; in particular, they include the consequences of system P. As it turns out, the LC consequence relation is strictly larger than �p. and precisely coincides with Pearl's system Z, as it appears from lemma 4 above.
Theorem 2. For a given A, a� 1 c 13 iff a � z 13.
S. Entailment based on Dempster's rule
The second way that we propose to strengthen the entailment relation (BF) is by considering only the ebf-models of A that can be built by using Dempster's rule of combination. The intuitive argument goes as follows. Suppose we regard each default in A as being one item of evidence provided by one of several distinct sources of information. 4 Then, it makes sense to represent each default individually by one belief function, and combine these belief functions by Dempster's rule to ob tain a representation of the aggregate effect of all the defaults. We can then define entailment by looking at the conditionals that are satisfied by the combined belief function. Auto-deduction principle. We require bel e I= a-+� for each default a-+� in A (i.e., bele is an ebf-model of A).
Least commitment principle. We want each ssf d to be as un-committed as possible (hence, each E d should be as large as possible).
For each d = a-+� in A, the first principle generates the con straint ( cf. lemma 1 ) max { ple(ro) s.t. ro1= <XA� } >00 max { ple(ro) s.t. ro1= aA-.� } which is equivalent to (cf. Lemma 5)
By solving the system given by all the C d 's, we can get con straints of the form E i >oo E j between some of the elements of E (and between products of elements). The second principle can be used to sanction equivalencies between unconstrained elements of E by the following argument. Suppose that, for some E i and E j , neither E i > 00 E j nor E j >oo E i is the case; as both Ej and E j should be made as large as possible, no one can be larger than the other, and then E i = E jWe now describe an algorithm to solve a set C of constraints of the form (C d ). We call term any product of elements of E, and complex term a term containing at least two elements of E. The algorithm returns a set�= {� o .. ... � n } of equivalence classes of terms such that: I) all the terms in a class are of the same order; 2 )' any term in � i is infinitely larger than any term in � j when i < j; and 3 ) any element of E is in some class.
Step 0. Let i = 0 , A t ={ t i I t i is a term and l>ool i is in C}. O.a Let �0 be a set of E i such that there exists a Step 1.
la. lb.
lc.
l.d. I.e.
1.f.
Step 2.
complex term t in A t which contains E i If �o=0 then �o=A t ; else �t=A K O and i=l Repeat until C = 0 Let i =i + 1 . Remove from C any satisfied constraint Let A t be a set of terms in C which does not appear in the right side of any constraint of C Let � i be a set of E i which does not appear in any � j <i and where there exists a complex term t in A t which contains E i If � i :t:. 0 then A t : =A t -� i and i = i+ 1 Let A E be the set of E i which does not appear neither in any constraint of C nor in any � j<i · Let�j=A t +A e Return the sets � j =l,i· i.e., max{EJ. £2} > 00 £3 Let us apply the previous algorithm. The set �0 contains ex actly one element £I. When we put eo in the highest value then all the constraints will be satisfied. Therefore the result is �o={ E l } , �t={£2 . £3}, .m d £I >co £2 = £3.
• We denote by Bele(A ) the family of e-bf's built by Dempster' s rule and whose parameter E satisfy the constraints above. As we did for the BelLc(A) family, we make sure that the elements of Bele(A) have the right properties for our goals: they are ebf-models of A, and they induce a unique or dering on n.
Lemma 6. Let A be a default base. Then: a) Any element of Bele(A) is an ebf-model of A. b) Let bel 1 and bel2 be elements of Bele(A), and< 1 and <2 the corresponding orderings induced on n. Then, < 1 = < 2.
Our third and last definition of entailment, called LCD (Least Commitment plus Dempster's rule), is obtained by focusing on the Ebf-models that are in Bele(A).
(LCD) a tv-led � iff for any bel e in Bele(A), be l e i= IX-+� Note that, as all the elements of Bele(A) are ebf-model of A, the tv-led relation is as least as strong as tv-bf · In particular, tv-led satisfies the KLM properties for system P (Kraus et al., 199 0 ) . In fact, LCD is strictly stronger than P. For exam ple, LCD correctly addresses the irrelevance problem, as shown by the following example.
Example 4. We first show how to use the result of the previous example to verify that bAp tv-led -.f. In fact, by applying lemmas l(b) and 5, we have ple([bApAf]) = e 2 and ple([bApA-.f]) "'Et • and we know that £I >oo £2. Next, con-sider a new property "red" (r) unrelated to b, p and f. We ex pect that red birds fly (note that this is not the case in system P). For any bel in Bele. and its corresponding pi, we have
, which implies bAr tv-led f, as was desired.
• The following theorem summarizes the relation between (LCD) and system P.
Theorem 3. For a given �. if a. tv-p � then a. tv-l e d�·
The converse is not true.
Analysis of LeD-consequence
We have seen that the LCD consequence relation gives us strictly more than system P; in particular, it correctly answers the problem of irrelevance. In this section, we study in more detail the patterns of reasoning that are captured by LCD. To do this, we consider the desiderata listed in the introduction, and show how LCD addresses them. We also contrast the LCD solution with the one obtained by other existing sys tems that go beyond system P.
We start by property inheritance. Several systems, including Pearl's system Z, suffer from the problem of inheritance blocking. The canonical example is built by adding to the usual penguin problem the default b � I (generally, birds have legs). From this, system Z cannot deduce that penguins have legs also, i.e., p I* z I. 5 By contrast, LCD allows that deduction, as shown below. i.e., 1 >oo E4
We apply our algorithm to this set. The first layer, � 0 · con tains exactly two elements: E 1 and E4. Once we constraint E1 and E4 to have the highest value, all the constraints are satis fied. Therefore we get: � 0 = {E 1 • E4} >oo � 1 = {Ez, E3}. To see if penguins have legs, we compute pl
pl((pA-. 1 1\-.bAf)), pJ((pA-.JA-.bA-.f))} = max{EzE4, E 1 E4, E2E3E4, EzE4} = E 1 E4 Therefore, pl ([pAI] ) > e pl([pA-. 1 ]), which implies p tv-l e d I as was desired.
• 5 Goldszmidt and Pearl (1991) have suggested an extension of z.
called z+, that-correctly handles this example. Unfortunately, z+ does not solve the problem of inheritance blocking in general: if we add the rules "Generally, legless birds are birds" and "Generally, legless birds do not have legs" to our base, then Z + cannot deduce both of "Legless birds fly" and "Penguins have legs"-it will just deduce one of them, depending on the ranking.
This problem is solve d by LCD.
Another desiderata listed in the introduction was the ability to stay uncommitted in cases of ambiguity. The following ex ample shows a case of ambiguity where system Z would de duce an undesired result, while LCD does not. The constraints that pie must satisfy are the same as in Example 3 , plus max {Pie{{ ro} )ICOI=mAf} >oo max {pie({ ro})ICOI=mA-.f} i.e., 1 >00 E4
We get the same ordering as before, with e4 in the top class:
� 0 = {E 1 • E4} >oo � 1 = {Ez, E3}. Consider now a bird that is a penguin and has metal wing. Given the base�. we can not say whether or not this beast will fly -we are in a case of ambiguity. And indeed we have:
As the ordering above says nothing of the relative magnitude of Ez and E 1 E4, we do not have neither bApAm tv-l e d f nor bApAm tv-l e d -.f. Notice, by contrast, that Z would give us the arbitrary result bApAm tv-z .... . f.
•
The following theorem summarizes the relation between LCD and system Z. The last desiderata in the introduction was syntax-indepen dence. The following example shows that LCD is not sensi tive to duplications of rules in the default base.
Example 7. Consider a variant of the Quaker-Republican problem where the rule "Generally, Quaker are pacifists" has been duplicated: � = { q�p. q�p. r�-.p}. By using a lexico graphic approach, we would deduce qAr � p, while we would prefer to acknowledge the ambiguity and deduce nothing. • We have shown that the LCD consequence relation behaves well with respect to all of the desiderata stated in the introduc tion. Unfortunately, there are cases where LCD gives us re sults whose intuitive acceptability is questionable. • The last example may be disappointing, in that we may con sider that we are in a case of ambiguity and we should stay silent. The reason for the answer given by LCD is to be found in the multi-source interpretation of the approach: hav ing two sources to independently j ustify a conclusion is re garded as a stronger reason to accept that conclusion. The as sumption of independence between the sources is essential to use Dempster's rule of combination; it may be interesting to study variants of LCD based on different rules of combination.
Three special cases
The LCD consequence relation has been built by giving each default d an infinitesimal weight E d . and combining these weights by Dempster's rule of combination. We then used the auto-deduction and least-commitment principles to con strain the possible values of the E d 's. As an alternative, we could have imposed some a-priori relation between the E d 's.
In this section, we show three special cases of consequence re lations obtained in the second way. The relations we get are already known in the literature: in the first case, we get the so-called "penalty logic" (Pinkas, 1992; Dupin et al., 1994) ; in the second case, we get the lexicographic approach Benferhat et al., 199 3 ; Lehmann, 199 3 ) ; and the last case leads to the preferred sub-theories of Brewka (1989) . For the tist case, we choose one "global" intinitesimal £, and we let, for each de .iio E d = e i . Then by applying Dempster's rule of combination we get for each interpretation:
where k i (ro) is the number of defaults of Ii i which are not sat isfied by the interpretation ro. We can interpret the resulting mass assignment me in terms of costs: each piece of information d of Ii i is associated to the cost c(d) =i , interpreted as the price to pay if d is not satisfied. Then each interpretation ro is associated the sum of the costs of pieces of information of .i which are falsified by ro, namely:
We can show �at C(ro) < C(ro') iff Ple(ro) >oo Ple(ro').
(Obvious, since ple(ro) = eLi=I,n [i · k i (ro)] = e C(E) . ) Hence, the non-monotonic consequence relation obtained by Belief functions and default reasoning 25 using Dempster's combination and the E d 's defined above generates the same results as the inference relation based on penalty logic (Pinkas, 1991; Dupin et al., 1994) .
For the second case, we equate all the E d 's of the defaults d that belong to the same layer Ii i . More precisely, we associ ate an infinitesimal E i to each layer Ii i . and, for each de Ii i . let E d = E i . We then ask that q is a positive real number in finitely small, and that, for any i > 1,
where l.ijl is number of default rules in the stratum .ij. We can show that the order on different interpretations obtained by using these £ d 's can be characterized as follows, where [ro] i is the number of defaults of Ii i satisfied by ro. Proposition 1. pl(ro) >oo p l(ro') if and only if there exist a positive number l�i <n such that:
This ordering corresponds to the so-called Lexicographical or dering defined in Benferhat et al., 199 3 ; Lehmann , 199 3 ) , and hence the consequence relation obtained by using Dempster's combination and the E d 's defmed above is the same as the one obtained by the lexicographic ap proaches. This ordering has also been considered in diagnosis by De Kleer (199 0 ) and Lang (1994) .
For the last case, let d i j be the j -th default (according to some arbitrary enumeration) in the i-th layer lij. Then, we associate d ij to an infinitesimal E i j such that: for a given i, E i j and E ik for k*.j are incomparable, E 1 j are positive real numbers infinitely small, and fi j =l,i-1 fi k= l ,l.ijl E j k >oo E i! for l = l,l.i i l, and i>l where l.i x l is number of default rules in layer <i x . Then, we can show that the order on the interpretations can be character ized in the following way, where [ro] i is the number of de faults of Ii i satistied by ro. Brewka (1989) , and later independently in troduced in in the setting of possibilistic logic. 6 Hence, the consequence relation obtained by using Dempster's combination and the E d 's defined above is the same as the one obtained by the system of Brewka.
As it is the case for our LCD system. all the three particular cases discussed in this section are strictly stronger than system P. In general, we state the following:
Theorem 5. LeD-consequence is incomparable with a ll of: penalty logic; the lexicographic approaches; and the preferred sub-theories approach.
• Conclusions
We have detailed a new approach to deal with default informa tion based on a special class of belief functions, and have used it to define three non-monotonic consequence relations. The last one, LCD-consequence, appears to be particularly attrac tive. We have proved that LCD is stronger than system P, and thus it satisfies the rationality postulates of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990) . Moreover, we have given ex amples showing that LCD correctly addresses the well-known problems of irrelevance (example 4); of blocking of inheri tance (example 5); of ambiguity (example 6); and of redun dancy (example 7). In this, LCD has a distinctive advantage over all currently existing approaches. Finally, we have shown that the construction used to defme LCD can be used to build alternative definitions of several existing systems of de fault reasoning, including penalty logic, the lexicographic ap proach, and Brewka's preferred sub-theories. Hence, our be lief-function based semantics for defaults appears to be able to capture many of the current systems in a common framework.
It is interesting to notice that, despite its good behaviour, LCD does not satisfy rational monotonicity. We. 'a!e currently studying different rules that can characterize LeD-consequence. Moreover, although LCD is insensitive to the number of rep etitions of the same default rule, it is sensitive to the number of different rules supporting the same conclusion. This is not surprising given that LCD is based on the interpretation of de faults as items of information provided by independent sources. We plan to explore variants of LCD that abandon the assumption of independence.
